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It is striking how many times the death-knell of the bourgeois family has been 
sounded this century. Equally striking is the similarity of means and instruments 
devised, or simply resurrected, in the interests of "preserving" a concept that has 
historically been more ideal than real. The "family besieged was the central motif 
of countless reformist campaigns in early twentieth-century Canada, inspiring a vast 
catalogue of proposed social remedies, from improved public health and housing 
through eugenicist, racist campaigns to sterilize the "unfit" and block immigration. 
Behind this family crisis theory were overlapping social groups, drawn largely from 
the urban, Protestant, "British" and professional cadre, who devoted themselves to 
promoting the traditional family ethic in response to, and frequently in spite of, 
changing historical contexts.' In so doing, they looked increasingly to the state to 
vanquish the foes, real and imagined, of the modern family. 
What explains the origins and persistence of this "save the family" campaign in 
its myriad forms? How did the health of the.family and that of society become so 
intertwined as to be synonymous? And how, in western societies largely given over 
to the individualist ideal, did the state come to be seen as the foremost arbiter of all 
such familial/social interests? Marxist theorists argue that the welfare state arose to 
ensure the reproduction of labour, the maintenance of society's economically-de- 
pendent (of whom women and children have historically formed the majority), and 
social stability.' Feminists have pointed out that state intervention also attempts to 
1 The literature on moral and social reform in Canada is extensive; of the more recent 
examples, see A. McLaren, Our Own Master Race (Toronto 1990); M .  Valverde, The Age 
of Light, Soap and Water (Toronto 1991), and, with specific reference to marriage and 
family, J. Snell, In the Shadow of the Law: Divorce in Canada 1900 - 1939 (Toronto 1991). 
Older studies that discuss intervention in the family for social purposes include N. Suther- 
land, Children in English Canadian Society (Toronto 1976); V .  Strong-Boag, The New Day 
Recalled (Markham 1988); and the seminal works by C. Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World 
(New York 1977), and J. Donzelot, The Policing of Families (New York 1979). On the 
"family ethic," see M. Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women (New York 1987). 
2 See, for example, J. Wayne, "The Function of Social Welfare in a Capitalist Economy," in 
J. Dickinson, B. Russell, eds., Family Economy and State (New York 1986), 56-7; J. 
Dickinson, "From Poor Law to Social Insurance," ibid., 115; E. Zaretsky, "Rethinking the 
Welfare State," ibid., 105; W. Seccombe, "The Expanded Reproduction Cycle of Labour 
Power in Twentieth-Century Capitalism," in B. Fox, ed., Hidden in the Household: 
Women's Domestic Labour Under Capitalism (Toronto 1980); F . F .  Piven, R.A. Cloward, 
Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York 1971); E.D. Berkowitz, 
"How to Think About the Welfare State," Labour History, 32, no. 4, (Fall 1991), 489-502; 
A. Finkel, "Origins of the Welfare State in Canada," in L. Panitch, ed. The Canadian State: 
104 left history 
meet the changing, at times conflicting, requirements of both capitalism and patriar- 
chy by institutionalizing class relations and upholding gender  distinction^.^ Catherine 
MacKinnon, in her deliberations on a feminist theory of the state, stresses the state's 
participation in "the sexual politics of male dominance" through its social po l ic ie~ .~  
Jane Ursel's5 recent analysis of the historical relationship between state and family 
in Canada reveals how the increasing contradiction between the needs of production 
and those of reproduction, already evident in the early stages of industrialization, 
eventually compelled the state to play a more active role in regulating and providing 
services for the labour force.6 As Ursel contends, the state is not meant to replace but 
to sustain the traditional head of family as provider and protector: "the state is the 
guarantor of the rules of class and the rules of patriarchy and must ensure that one 
system does not disturb the other".7 
Dorothy Chunn, in From Punishment to Doing Good: Family Courts and Social- 
ized Justice in Ontario, 1880-1940, narrows the scope in this on-going examination 
of the relationship of family and state by focussing on a specific reform initiative in 
Ontario, the family court. Chunn argues that "social work leaders recurrently identi- 
fied crises of the family that coincided with the periods of greatest dissonance 
between their childrearing practices and family life and those of non-middle class 
children and parents." At these various junctures, reformers perceived both an 
immediate danger to the family and "an ultimate threat to the foundations of the social 
order." (40) Adopting "ecological explanations" that stressed environmental factors 
in the making of "pathological families," they sought to persuade targeted social 
groups "to embrace and adhere to alien standards of childrearing and family life 
associated with the bourgeois family model." (42) Chunn concludes that their efforts 
brought about "marked changes in the response to marginality" between 1880 and 
1940, shaking adherence to the minimal state and laying the foundations for interven- 
Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto 1977); A. Moscovitch, J .  Albert, e d ~ .  The 
Benevolent State: the Growth of Welfare in Canada (Toronto 1987) For a critical review of 
recent specialized studies in social welfare history, see J. Struthers, "The Provincial 
Welfare State: Social Policy in Ontario," Journal of Canadian Studies, 27, no. I, (Spring 
1992). 136-46. 
3 For an overview of feminist discussion of the welfare state from various ideological 
directions, see Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women, ch. 1. 
4 C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass. 1989), 167-70. 
5 J. Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family (Toronto 
1992). 
6 Marxist theorists are only just beginning to develop a theory of reproduction despite 
warnings by Marx and Engels that a complete analysis of any social formation calls for such 
an understanding; see, for example, Capital, vol. 1, (Moscow n.d.), 356-7. Engels noted how 
family forms both reflect and sustain changes in economic organization, explaining the 
subordination of women by the place accorded to their reproductive capacities under 
capitalism; "The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State," in Marx, Engels, 
Selected Works, vol. 3, (Moscow 1970), 191. Catharine MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State provides a thorough feminist critique of Engels, 19-24, and a larger 
discussion of feminism and Marxism, 3-60. See also J. Dickinson, B. Russell, "Introduction: 
The Structure of Reproduction in Capitalist Society," in Dickinson, Russell, eds. Family, 
State and Economy, 2-4. 
7 Ursel, "The State and the Maintenance of Patriarchy," in Dickinson, Russell, eds. Family, 
State and Economy, 155-7; further developed in Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy, Part I ,  
17-58. 
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tionist family-centred policies and programs. (43) By means of "non-coercive strate- 
gies for upgrading standards of family life," these reform initiatives proved phenome- 
nally successful. Reformers' conceptions of childhood and family became "more and 
more hegemonic within the middle class itself and across social classes from the 1880s 
to the 1940s." (43) Ultimately, the fapily courts, in seeking to uphold the bourgeois 
family model, "helped reproduce the class and gender divisions that make up the 
status quo in western market societies." (179) 
There are certain assumptions at work here, and throughout the detailing of policy 
that follows, that historians will question. It is important, first of all, to give some 
consideration to the issue of how "alien" the bourgeois family model actually was to 
the working class. Do we accept it as somehow "alien" by definition, or "alien" simply 
in accordance with middle-class perceptions? Either way, we need more information 
about the internal dynamics of early twentieth-century working-class families to 
provide the comparative angle that the argument requires. It follows, then, that the 
increasing hegemony of reformers' conceptions of family and childhood also needs 
more substantiation through evidence independent of the reformers themselves. 
Again, this conclusion is premised on the assumption that working-class families 
gradually mutated.from their inherently "alien" form to the middle-class form 
idealized by tenacious reformist types over the course of a half-century. I am not 
suggesting that this is science fiction: the point is that we cannot know how the story 
ends without a clearer sense of its starting point. Despite obvious differences rooted 
in very real material concerns - a focus on collective survival in the working-class 
family, for example, as opposed to middle-class individual self-actualization - there 
is no reason for historians to ascribe wholeheartedly to the reformers' own views of 
the dissolution and upheaval, parental negligence and juvenile criminality that 
supposedly typified the working-class family. Did reformers really teach these 
parents the need for concern about, and responsibility toward, their children? Or is it 
possible that their direct intervention in Ontario homes provided evidence of a 
parentlchild relationship that they depicted as new largely because of their own 
conviction that it did not previously exist? 
In addition, if reformers believed that delinquency was "so obviously" the mo- 
nopoly of non-middle class children, what explains their failure to confront the 
material basis of the problem? They saw that poverty incited family breakdown, bred 
deviance, and threatened to undermine the system, yet their brand of intervention was 
premised on "training" and moral regulation. This educational approach was cheaper, 
less threatening to those who feared state intervention (so often equated with 
Bolshevism in this period) even while calling for it, and ensured a healthy social status 
and income for the emergent breed of helping professionals. The class aspects of this 
tale, while certainly acknowledged, are much more complex than presented, and 
therefore beg more analysis. 
The environmental definitionlsolution espoused by family court reformers also 
contradicts the pervasive eugenicist assumptions of the period that underlay so many 
of its social movements. But no consideration is given to the potential for conflict 
between coexistent hereditarian and environmentalist reform paradigms, a source of 
tension for reformers of all persuasions 'in the early twentieth century. There is 
mention made, but little more, of the tremendous social and ideological impact of the 
Great War and the Great Depression. Both had significant effects on attitudes and 
policies toward social welfare, on class and gender relations, on families, and on the 
socially-conscious who were anxiously observing all these.8 In short, while the author 
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is clearly sensitive to historical context, a lot of it is still missing, particularly in the 
realm of ideological shifts. 
Professor Chunn does present a thorough examination of the development of 
social welfare policy with respect to the particulars of socialized justice and family 
courts. She shows how the socialization process that slowly unfolded during the 
interwar years was impeded by ideological splits among social welfare leaders and 
government lawyers/bureaucrats. There was no unified support for socialized courts 
within the wider social work and legal professions, a support that she regards as "the 
prerequisite for their widespread development." For advocates of socialized justice, 
these various obstacles pre-empted, until the Second World War, the creation of a 
coherent, organized national movement for the establishment of family courts. (52) 
Such influential social welfare leaders as Charlotte Whitton, head of the period's most 
important social service tribunal, never gave the Canadian Council on Child and 
Family Welfare's support to family courts because she believed that "such matters 
ought to be handled by lawyer-judges who were legal professionals." (150) Home 
visits, clinics, the growing reliance on experts and expertise, all point to profession- 
alization and "expert-worship" as important contributing elements also evident in 
other reformist campaigns of the period. The period's intensifying drive for profes- 
sional autonomy and authority is a significant undercurrent that is never really 
brought to the fore.' 
Competing, at times conflicting, philosophies of socialized justice and legal 
formalism, combined with the lack of substantive commitment to social welfare by 
successive Ontario governments, meant that policy-makers were "probably moved 
primarily by monetary considerations." (50) If reformers could make a reasonable 
argument for economic rationalization, their objectives might be realized in legisla- 
tion. Chunn demonstrates that the welfare state in this country was built gradually 
and incrementally, in piecemeal and often ad hoc fashion, subject foremost and 
always to financial considerations. Its construction was plagued by internal wrangling 
over objectives and means, a diehard commitment to the minimal state, and relentless 
inter-governmental parrying over jurisdictional issues. Nonetheless, by 1940 a new, 
private, technocratic justice system was operational, "albeit not fully developed," in 
Ontario's juvenile and family courts. (188) 
Curiously, the author does not pursue the relationship between capitalistic impera- 
tives and social welfare, despite this evidence of the historical existence of "bottom 
line" politics that consistently protect the wealth of the few before the needs of the 
many. She raises the issue of state intervention "to enforce the privatization of the 
costs of social reproduction" (49) but does not employ the concept of social repro- 
8 A great deal remains to be done in this area, with D. Guest's The Emergence of Social 
Security in Canada (2nd edition, Toronto 1988) and J .  Struthers, No Fault o f  Their Own 
(Toronto 1983) still the principal examples of studies that consider the wars and the 
Depression in this manner; see also B.D. Palmer, Working Class Experience (2nd edition, 
Toronto 1992). ch. 5 ,  214-63. 
9 Paul Avelrod discusses the development and social composition of  the professional class 
in English Canada in the early 20th century in his Making a Middle Class: Student Life in 
English Canada during the Thirties (MontreallKingston 1990), 9-11; see also Valverde, The 
Age of Light, Soap and Water .  
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duction analytically, using it as a descriptive term that categorizes without explaining, 
and that obscures its crucial relationship with production. 
Ultimately, this book is at its best as a policy study. It carefully lays out the 
complicated net of ideas, social relations and material realities that caught up the 
reform-minded, the "experts" in social work and law, the politicians, and the "mar- 
ginal populations" whose intimate relationships they wanted to regulate into some 
semblance of the ideal bourgeois family model. But, after a very useful introductory 
survey of the literature on family and reform, the institutional, internal policy focus 
that takes over leaves me wanting more. In particular, I want more people in this story. 
Where are the families, the parents and children, affected directly and indirectly by 
reformist ideas, and especially by these courts established expressly for them? There 
are a few intriguing glimpses of them in the closing pages. Here, Chunn concludes 
that, "despite the cost of the services rendered - infiltration of their homes and 
increasingly of their heads - by the state," many of Ontario's working and dependent 
poor regarded the family court as "a considerble improvement upon the old-style 
police court." The additional levy on women, she notes, was a "perpetuation of their 
restricted and subordinate role outside the domestic realm." (195) 
The human costs, then, were indisputably high. While the problem of sources is 
all too familiar to social historians, the book's focus on ideologues, policymakers and 
administrators allows for little sense of popular opinion regarding the courts, the need 
for them, response to them and their efficacy, much less of other-than-bourgeois views 
of the state of the family. If the class and gender repercussions are recognized, they 
are considered primarily from the vantage point of what the reformers aimed to 
achieve. So much of the responsibility for the family was ascribed to mothers, on 
whose behalf the new courts were often called upon to act. But we are not left with 
any real sense of the implications for poor families, and especially for women within 
those families. How did they respond to this unprecedented state scrutiny through 
regular home inspection? Chunn seems to accept at face value the inspectors' 
assessments of both home conditions and family response to their visits and advice. 
Yet the evidence from which she derives positive conclusions about the client 
families' participation is largely prescriptive and promotional. Even an impression of 
the public, as opposed to the uniquely professionaVinterna1 debate on the family court 
issue, would help bridge the gap between the "owners of social welfare discourse" 
and the recipients of their policies. 
Much of this study's relevance is current. We are clearly not through with theories 
concerning "the family besieged": in one of its most pernicious recent manifesta- 
tions, the lament about the demise of the traditional family (rigidly defined as 
husband, wife and their dependent children) is painfully familiar, while, ironically, 
the "state as saviour" has itself been transformed to "state as foremost enemy."'O In 
addition, the piece-by-piece dismantling of the welfare state at the triumphant hands 
10 W.D. Gairdner, The War Against the Family (Toronto 1993) is  a impassioned right-wing 
attack on the "liberal conspiracy" that is  deliberately destroying the family, with the state 
as its principal instrument through its nefarious reforms respecting welfare, children's 
rights, women's rights, gay and lesbian rights, divorce, sex education, abortion and contra- 
ception, etc. Singled out for particular invective are the "socialist" governments of Ontario, 
British Columbia and Saskatchewan, which seek nothing less than to replace the family 
with the state. 
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of neoconservatism has inspired interest in the motives and methods behind its initial 
construction. If somewhat disappointing to social historians, Dorothy Chunn's analy- 
sis of the development of family courts in Ontario is nonetheless an important addition 
to our understanding of the modernization of relations between state and citizen, state 
and family, and, within our particular federal context, between state levels. It helps 
to fill an existing void in Canadian historiography as we attempt to "bring the state 
back in."" We only have to remember not to give the state a life purely its own by 
leaving the people out. 
11 See P. Evans, D. Ruescherneyer, T. Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (New York 
1985); for Canada, see A.  Moscovitch, J .  Albert, eds. The Benevolent State: The Growth of 
Welfare in Canada (Toronto 1987); Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy. 
